INTRODUCTION

"He (Jim Cramer) was a brilliant hedge-fund trader, but hedge-fund trader doesn't necessarily make a great coach for a general audience,"-Don Harold, DayTradeShow.com "He's smart enough to know what he's doing. 'Mad Money' delivers a very dangerous message -that individual investors can beat the market with momentum-driven, high-octane trading strategies". -David Swenson, Yale University Endowment Fund Manager
This study is not intended to praise nor to scrutinize the Mad Hatter behind the Mad Money machine. His show, which airs weekdays at 6:00 P.M. since 2005, is intended to educate, through a practical application of fundamental and technical market analysis for the casual investor. He seeks to entertain, through elaborate sounds, voices, and a signature "Booyah" catch phrase to say the least, but most of all to make viewers money, for "there's always a bull market somewhere" and Cramer's promise is to find it for his audience. Jim Cramer's performance as a stock picker and financial guru is irrelevant to this study. For starters, he plays with an open hand. His picks can be seen five days prior to their execution and must be held for at least 30 days-to win under these constraints would be quite impressive as is. His charitable trust portfolio can be viewed via Actions AlertPlus at www.thestreet.com. Rather, this study aims to decipher investor behavioral patterns while controlling for market cycles. This study will test semi-strong efficiency by observing the recommendations of Jim Cramer, the charismatic, comedic, and controversial, host of CNBC's Mad Money. It extends the literature by analyzing the effect of his recommendations on share prices in bull and bear markets and by using several behavioral biases to explain investor reaction through the lenses of prospect theory, overreaction, and herding.
A main reason for using Jim Cramer's recommendations is to overcome the potential conflict of interest problem associated with affiliated analysts addressed by Michaely and Womack (1999) . Their study found affiliated underwriters tended to provide a rosier picture, offering larger quantities of buy recommendations than unaffiliated analysts. The evidence indicated that buy recommendations of unaffiliated analysts outperformed those of affiliated analysts. Jim Cramer, although affiliated with CNBC, is an unaffiliated analyst as he must specifically disclose securities which he holds in his charitable trust portfolio on his show.
Other studies point to evidence of abnormal returns in response to analyst recommendations. Barber and Loeffler (1993) , Womack (1996) , Barber et. al. (2001 ), Jegadeesh et. al (2004 , and Barber et. al. (2006) find evidence of abnormal returns when testing recommendations from other analyst sources. Neumann and Kenny (2007) , Keasler and McNeil (2008) , Bolster, Trahan, and Venkateswaran (2011), and Williams (2012) found evidence of abnormal returns in response to Mad Money recommendations. On the contrary, findings from Kim, Lin, and Slovin (1997) , and Busse and Green (2002) support semistrong efficiency in regards to the effect of analyst recommendations on share prices.
This study uses a risk-adjusted model of Brown and Warner (1985) Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as well as the disposition effect of Shefrin and Statman (1985) . Evidence also exists consistent with the herding and overreaction hypotheses.
RELATED LITERATURE
The literature can be categorized along the following five topics (1) Efficient Market Hypothesis, (2) impact of analyst recommendations on share prices, (3) impact of Mad Money recommendations on share prices, (4) bull and bear market implications, and (5) behavioral finance implications.
Efficient Market Hypothesis
The notion that markets are efficient has been a point of controversy since Eugene Fama proposed the efficient-market hypothesis (EMH) in the mid-1960s. Fama (1970) regards weakform efficiency as a market where historical data is factored into an asset's price, semi-strong form, where all publicly available information is reflected, and strong-form, where non-public, or insider, information is reflected. Semi-strong form assumes that public information of any kind, in this case analyst equity recommendations, is promptly and correctly factored into the share price, without any opportunity for an investor to earn an abnormal return.
Malkiel's "random-walk" proposition supports the theoretical basis of EMH. Asset prices are said to follow no pattern at all, with all pricing information being immediately reflected. Due to the unpredictable nature of news, Malkiel (1975) consequently deems share prices unpredictable in the same light. Other skeptics including Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) who contend share prices cannot accurately reflect all available data, or else information gatherers would not have profitable opportunities.
Impact of Analyst Recommendations on Share Prices
The question of what impact analyst recommendations have on share prices was first proposed by Cowles (1933) by attempting to determine the forecasting power of analysts. From here, a growing body of literature provides evidence to suggest the existence of profitable trading strategies and market inefficiencies associated with analyst recommendations. Barber and Loeffler (1993) find evidence of abnormal returns due to "naïve buying pressure" while observing the Wall Street Journal's "Dartboard" column. Womack (1996) Jegadeesh et. al (2004) find evidence that changes in analyst recommendations have a significant effect on future returns.
The idea that analyst recommendations lead to semi-strong inefficiency is contradicted by Busse and Green (2002) who claim that profitable trading strategies disappear seconds after the broadcasting of televised analyst recommendations. Similarly, Findings from Kim, Lin, and Slovin (1997) support the notion that the type of media broadcast determines an analyst's effect by concluding that recommendations from Dow Jones newswire have no effect on share prices.
Taken a step further, Barber et. al. (2006) discover the distributions of buy, hold, and sell ratings among analysts can serve as performance predictors i.e. those with the lowest percentage of buy ratings tend to have superior "buy" performance to those with larger percentages. Such behavior could be evident of an inherent conflict of interest among affiliated versus nonaffiliated analysts. Surely a sell-side analyst could possess ulterior motives or incentives that differ from those of a non-affiliated analyst. The work of Dugar and Nathan (1995) finds that affiliated analyst recommendations tend to be more optimistic than unaffiliated-suggesting a sell-side conflict of interest as the culprit. According to Michaely and Womack (1999) compendium of analyst recommendations from G7 countries to discover that buy ratings outnumber sell ratings in bull markets, with sell ratings outnumbering buys in bear markets-a theoretically understandable assumption. In order to test impact in bull and bear markets, a definable measure must first be used to differentiate and characterize market cycles. According to Candelon, Piplack, and Straetmans (2008) , no consensus exists on bull and bear market definition in the academic literature. Burns and Mitchell (1946) provide a rough framework, defining bull (bear) markets as a period of substantial rise (decline) from a preceding trough (peak), but the term "substantial" makes this claim ambiguous. Other studies including Harding and Pagan (2002) , and Pagan and Sossounov (2003) , use a variety of statistical models including Markov Chain, GARCH, EGARCH, and a random walk to determine market turning points and cycles.
Behavioral Finance Implications
There are several theories why investors would respond differently to analyst recommendations in bull versus bear markets. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose prospect theory which contends that investors face loss aversion-investors are more negatively affected by losses than they are positively affected by gains. The disposition effect, a subset of prospect theory proposed by Shefrin and Statman (1985) , states that market participants tend to sell winning stocks too quickly, in an effort to avoid losses, and hold losers too long, in an effort to recoup losses. This stands in contrast to Expected Utility Theory of Schoemaker (1982) which weighs gains and losses equally.
De Bondt (1993) tests another explanation, the overreaction hypothesis, which states investors expect past trends to repeat themselves, experiencing optimism in bull markets and pessimism in bear markets. According to this theory, investors would overreact to buy recommendations and disregard sell recommendations in bull markets while overreacting to sell recommendations and disregarding buys in bear markets. Shleifer and Summers (1990) describe overreaction as a participant's likelihood to place a greater emphasis on new informationsimilar to De Bondt and Thaler (1985) who claim overreaction occurs in response to "unexpected" and "dramatic" news events.
Welch (2000) believes news tends to have a more profound effect in optimistic markets than in pessimistic markets due to the term Bikhchandani et. al. (1992) refers to as "fragility."
Markets are assumed to be more fragile in bull periods due to their tendency to "aggregate less information" than bear periods. Welch contends this lack of information can lead to herding.
The cousin of an overreactor would likely be a herder, one who purchases and sells securities with the crowd while basing decisions on past returns. Welch explains there is no theoretical explanation for larger propensities of herding in bull versus bear markets. Shleifer and Summers (1990) Prospect theory leads us to believe that investors, being loss-averse, will feel the pain of bear markets more than as the joy of bull markets. In bull markets, we expect sell recommendations will have a greater impact on share prices, due to what Kahneman and Tversky (1985) describe as a tendency to forgo gains at the risk of incurring losses. Combining this with the expanded explanation of the disposition effect by Shefrin and Statman (1985) , we posit bear market participants will hold onto losers in response to buy recommendations with a greater propensity than bull market participants sell winners in response to sell recommendations. Engelberg (2010) and Odean (2008) suggest that sell recommendations can be more difficult to act on as an investor because selling shares of an already-owned security is often easier than entering a short position. However, Bolster and Trahan (2008) find Cramer's sell recommendations have a greater impact on share prices due to price momentum effects. We take each of these alternatives into consideration. If prospect theory holds true, we expect greater abnormal returns to occur after sell recommendations in bull markets compared with buys, and buy recommendations in bear markets compared with sells.
Overreaction
According to the overreaction hypothesis described by De Bondt (1993) , another explanation for varying levels of abnormal returns could stem from an investor's optimism in good times and pessimism in bad times. This overreaction and belief that past trends will repeat themselves could cause a larger response to buy recommendations in bull markets and a greater response to sell recommendations in bear markets. Shleifer and Summers (1990) describe overreaction as a participant's likelihood to place a greater emphasis on new informationsimilar to De Bondt and Thaler (1985) who claim overreaction occurs in response to "unexpected" and "dramatic" news events. Extended periods of abnormal returns in the opposite direction of an initial abnormal return may suggest evidence of overreaction; likewise, the persistence of abnormal returns in the same direction over time may indicate under reaction.
Herding
We also consider the herding hypothesis. According to Shleifer and Summers (1990) individual investors who follow the same indicators (analyst recommendations in our case) may participate in herding activity-that is, behavior characterized by following the advice of
Cramer. When observing herding activity amongst analysts, Welch (2000) finds that greater degrees of herding occurs in bull versus bear markets, but offers no theoretical explanation as to why. Furthermore, evidence from Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) supports the notion of mutual funds engaging in herding activity, or purchasing and selling securities at the same time.
In the framework of this hypothesis, we expect significant evidence of abnormal returns in response to buy recommendations and sell recommendations. separated picks by Lightning round and non-Lightning round, we used the first time a stock was mentioned on the show as the best opportunity for an abnormal return to occur.
Research Design
Bull and bear markets are determined using two different rules to identify what Burns and Mitchell (1946) describe as "substantial" periods of prolonged rises and falls. Since our dataset gave us a good pre and post-financial crisis window, for our first rule we used the peak S&P 500
closing price of our sample period on October 9 th 2007 as our cut-off, and we label the period before October 9 th as Bull1 and the period after October 9 th as Bear1. Our second rule divided our data period into multiple bull and bear periods using a three-up week and three-down week method. Using weekly S&P 500 closing price data, bull periods began on the first week of a three consecutive week uptick in closing prices. Bear periods, respectively, were marked by Table 1 below. We use a risk-adjusted model of Brown and Warner (1985) where the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index is the proxy for the market, and we estimate the abnormal return on the days surrounding a first time Mad Money buy or sell recommendation. The market model is specified as:
Where:
= abnormal return for stock i at day t = return for stock i at day t = return on the market at time t
RESULTS
Abnormal Return Analysis
The results of our analyses are presented here, beginning with the abnormal return analysis. Table 2 reports daily abnormal returns of all first time buy and sell recommendations over a five-day period before and after the event without controlling for bull and bear markets.
We find statistically significant evidence at the 0.1% level of a 0.4844 positive abnormal return on the first day following buy recommendations. This finding supports the herding hypothesisthat investors act on the advice of Cramer's buy recommendations. We also find statistically significant evidence of negative abnormal returns on days +2, +3,+4, and +5 after the event. We contend that this suggests evidence consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. A prolonged period of negative abnormal returns indicates prices are mean reverting after an initial overreaction after the buy recommendation. This corresponds with Shleifer and Summers (1990) claim that investors place a greater emphasis on new information.
We find statistical significance at the 0.1% for a negative 0.1442 abnormal return on day +1 following sell recommendations. This result also indicates herding in response to the Cramer sell recommendations. On days +2+,+3,and +4 and +5, negative abnormal returns level persist to (-3.411)**** (-0.311) (-0.747) (-3.447)**** (-4.211)**** (-2.716)*** (-5.054)**** (-4.987)**** 34%:66% 36%:64% 32%:68% 33%:67% 34%:66% 36%:64% 32%:68% 29%:71% *,**,***,**** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.
AR (-2) AR (-1) AR (0) AR (+1) AR (+2) AR (+3) AR (+4) AR (+5)
Average abnormal returns estimated using market adjusted model. Abnormal returns (AR) presented with cross-sectional t-statistics in parentheses. Proportion positive: proportion negative shown in italics. N is the number of useable observations at day 0.
drift downwards suggesting under reaction, i.e., prices react to the sell recommendation, but do not fall enough, as they continue to decline over the following days. Contrary to semi-strong form efficiency proposed by Fama (1970) , which states prices immediately reflect public information, the reaction to sell recommendations is neither full nor immediate giving evidence to support the notion that markets are not efficient at the semi-strong level. Bear 2 identifies bulls and bears using a three up week and three down week method. We find statistically significant evidence at the 1% and 5% levels for positive abnormal returns of 0.3280 respectively. In addition, we find statistically significant evidence at the 5% and 1% levels for positive abnormal returns of 2.2412 and 1.4021 following buy recommendations in Bear 1 and Bear 2 markets, respectively. The greater degree of positive abnormal returns in bear markets compared to bull markets suggests a buy recommendation in a bear market has a larger initial impact than a buy recommendation in a bull market. It seems investors in bull markets have a lesser propensity to act on buy recommendations-perhaps because they are satisfied with the current level of gains and do not want to risk more funds to possibly incur losses. In bear markets, a buy recommendation has a greater impact, possibly due to a belief buying (on positive information) in a down market has a greater chance of being successful than buying on positive information in an up market-reflecting a buy low, sell high mentality. Initially, in regards to prospect theory, we surmised that investors would be less likely to act on buy recommendations in bear markets, believing that losses associated with bear periods would be felt more, and therefore would spook investors into possibly incurring more losses, but this evidence suggests contrarian behavior in which investors respond positively to good news in bad times-perhaps, in effort to stay the course and at least break even. This behavior can also be indicative of the disposition effect proposed by Shefrin and Statman (1985) ; losers tend to hold on to losses in hopes of recouping them. Thus, positive information in bad times could further persuade market participants to hang on to or buy more of losers, while also persuading non-shareholders to buy in as well. The end result is an initial positive abnormal return in response to buy recommendations in a bear market which surpasses the magnitude of the negative abnormal return caused by sell recommendations in a bull market.
AR (-2) AR (-1) AR (0) AR (+1) AR (+2) AR (+3) AR (+4) AR (+5)
The results also show statistically significant evidence at the 1% level for day +2 of negative abnormal returns in bull markets and at the 0.1% level for days +3 through +5. This could indicate prices reverting back to their mean due to an initial overreaction. Table 4 reports daily abnormal returns in response to sell recommendations in bull and bear markets. We have statistically significant evidence at the 0.1% level of negative abnormal returns for days +1 through +5 in both Bull 1 and Bull 2 markets. On the contrary we found no evidence of abnormal returns after sell recommendations in Bear 1 or Bear 2 markets. It seems markets participants react to sell recommendations by selling a stock in a bull market rather than a bear market. This finding indicates sell recommendations have little impact in bear markets, 38%:62% 42%:58% 43%:57% 43%:57% 54%:46% 40%:60% 34%:66% *,**,***,**** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. and also, that investors are responsive to negative signals in up markets. Similar to our findings of increased levels of positive abnormal returns following buy recommendations in bear markets, this evidence supports this claim from a sell recommendation standpoint. Market participants seem to possess a greater degree of loss aversion in bull markets, and possess a greater tendency secure their gains or sell short in response to sell recommendations. This result corresponds with our initial prospect theory hypothesis that sell recommendations in bull markets cause greater levels of abnormal returns than buy recommendations in bull markets. Prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is expanded on by Shefrin and Statman (1985) who describe the tendency to sell winners too soon and hang on to losers too long as the disposition effect. It is possible that sell recommendations in bull markets gave market participants justification to dump winners in order to lock in gains.
Buy recommendations in bear markets and sell recommendations in bull market suggest further evidence of the disposition effect. These two subsamples provided our most substantial indications of abnormal returns associated with buy and sell recommendations. Positive abnormal returns associated with buy recommendations in bear markets exceed the magnitude of negative abnormal returns associated with sell recommendations in bull markets. Buy recommendations in Bear 1 and Bear 2 markets experience positive abnormal returns on day +1 of 2.2412 and 1.4021 at the 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively, whereas sell recommendations in Bull 1 and Bull 2 markets experience negative abnormal returns on day +1 of -0.6178 and -0.7366 at the 0.1% significance level, respectively. The buy in a bear market impact is twice (or more than twice) as great compared to each contrasting sell in a bull market impact. This behavior is consistent with prospect theory and supports the disposition effect of Shefrin and Statman (1985) . Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest that investors feel the need to recoup their losses twice as much as the need to lock in gains. Buy and sell recommendations appear to be triggers which cause investors to engage in loss aversion behavior in bear and bull markets, respectively.
The level of utility for an equivalent gain is half the magnitude of the drop in utility for an equivalent loss. In other words, losses are felt twice as much as gains, or in our case, bear periods are felt twice as negatively as bulls are felt positively. An illustration is of prospect theory's asymmetric value function is presented below. Source: Kahneman and Tversky (1979) It is reasonable to find that buy recommendations in bull markets result in double the positive abnormal return than the negative abnormal return of sell recommendations in bull markets due to a bias which causes an investor to hold on to losers longer (using buy recommendations to confirm one's stubbornness) and sell winners faster (using sell recommendations to rationalize a quick gain).
Cumulative Abnormal Return Analysis
The following analysis discusses cumulative abnormal returns associated with buy and sell recommendations in bull and bear markets. Table 5 reports cumulative abnormal returns for the total buy and sell recommendation samples without controlling for bull and bear markets. This table shows sell recommendations seem to have a larger impact than buy recommendations which is suggested by a -0.3518 CAR (0,+5) significant at the 10% level for buy recommendations and a -1.9744 CAR(0,+5) for sell recommendation. This finding is consistent with Bolster and Trahan (2008) who attribute this greater impact of Mad Money sell recommendations to price momentum effects. Table 6 reports cumulative abnormal returns in response to buy recommendations in bull and bear markets. In period (0,+2) buy recommendations lead to positive abnormal returns of 2.9166 and 0.5734 significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Contrary evidence does not exist for buy recommendations in bull markets for the same period. This suggests a buy recommendation in a bear market has a greater impact than a buy recommendation in a bull market. There is also significant evidence of negative cumulative abnormal returns extending towards latter periods [(0,+5); ( +1,+10); and (0,+20)] in response to buy recommendations in bull markets which may suggest overreaction; however, longer windows may provide unreliable results and should be interpreted with caution. Table 7 suggests that market participants react more to sell recommendations in bull markets than to sell recommendations in bear markets. This is supported by statistically significant evidence at the 1% level for greater degrees of negative abnormal returns in bull markets in the (0,+2) (0,+5) (+1,+10) and (0,+20) event periods. We find no evidence of cumulative abnormal returns in response to sell recommendations in bear markets leading us to assume a contrarian mindset on behalf of market participants. They respond to bad news in good times by selling stock or selling short while disregarding and neglecting to act on gloomy information in gloomy times. 
CAR (-5,0) CAR (0,+2) CAR (0,+5) CAR (+1,+1) CAR (+1,+2) CAR (+1,+10) CAR (0,+20)
CONCLUSION
This study investigates behavioral finance implications associated with the impact of Mad Money recommendations on share prices in bull and bear markets. Evidence of mean reversion in days +2, +3, +4, and +5 following buy recommendations indicates overreaction.
Results also indicate evidence of downwards drifting prices in response to sell recommendations which indicate under reaction. Both findings suggest inefficiency at the semi-strong level.
Results also show herding in response to Cramer's buy and sell recommendations with positive and negative abnormal returns, respectively, on the day following the announcement. Our event study suggests, in line with prospect theory and the disposition effect, bear market participants respond to buy recommendations with twice the propensity that bull market participants respond to sell recommendations-indicating loss aversion tendencies which value gains and losses differently, contrary to Expected Utility Theory. Disutility associated with a loss is two times the utility associated with a gain; in other words, investors hold losers too long, in hopes of recouping losses, and sell winners too soon, in hopes of locking in gains.
